Parties are often treated as unitary actors, where individual members coalesce to reach common goals. However, individuals or larger factions in parties must overcome a variety of collective action problems in coordinating.
2 Many scholars have looked at these issues in the context of party formation, but few have considered how factional dynamics can make the unitary actor assumption untenable after the initial formation.
Factions impinge on the process of party position-taking. They bind the leader in the choice of party platform, which is not solely determined by the overall policy preferences of individual members. Recent research shows that factional preferences determine party position and influence party change and policymaking. 3 Scholars have shown that factional affiliation and heterogeneous policy preferences generate party disunity in roll call votes and may explain differences in parliamentary voting behaviour. 4 Relaxing the unitary actor assumption can also help analyzing coalition governments. 5 On the one hand, factionalized parties may help overcome gridlock in decision-making or coalition formation, 6 but on the other hand factional disputes over portfolio allocation may undermine cabinet stability and survival.
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Giannetti and Laver highlight how, 'In the real political world … it is often difficult to discuss the making and breaking of parties without referring to factions or groupings of some shape and form'. 8 Accordingly, this article analyzes the determinants of party fission, which potentially can alter the nature of party competition and even the party system.
In my theoretical framework, I consider factions to be rational actors coordinating their members' behaviour in order to maximize their own share of payoffs. As a consequence, their decision to exit or adhere to the party is based on the estimated policy, office, and electoral payoffs, but also interaction with the party leader, who alters her responses to minority requests depending on her interest in either party unity (keeping the party together) or cohesion (enhancing agreement on the party line).
Factionalized parties may be found in several countries, and internal disputes are potential sources of party break-up worldwide. 9 However, this article will focus on Italy, often seen as the prime example of 'the politics of faction'. 10 In both the First (1946 First ( -1993 and the Second Republic (1994-present) , Italian parties faced bitter internal conflicts, often leading to splits and reshuffles of the party system. Beside the high frequency of party splits, the Italian case has some more advantages. The large number of parties in each Legislature (approximately ten) and the broad number of factions (on average, three within each divided party) make a large-N statistical analysis feasible. Moreover, the high instability rate of Italian cabinets (sixty governments in sixty-five years) allows tracking changes in alliances, party policy positions, and intra-party portfolio allocations on a nearly annual basis. Furthermore, the reforms implemented since 1993 allow assessing the effects of different electoral systems while holding country-level features constant. Thus, Italy provides a suitable political laboratory to test hypotheses based on the general theoretical model.
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Quantitative text analysis of a large number of documents on the 'internal life' of Italian parties allows us to determine the policy preferences of intra-party actors. I create a dataset with information on the ideal points of 254 Italian party factions from 1946 to 2011, based on motions presented during party congresses. This dataset provides new data on intra-party politics, 12 and allows broadening the analysis of party fission beyond offices and electoral motives.
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My results support the argument that faction behaviour is driven by several motives and shaped by policy incentives in addition to office and electoral 11 Giannetti and Grofman 2011. 12 There have been few attempts to estimate the policy positions of party factions: Bernauer and Bräuninger 2009; Spirling and Quinn 2010. 13 Laver and Benoit 2003. rewards. Strategic portfolio allocation, party loyalty, and disproportional electoral systems that increase the exit costs tend to preserve party unity. Conversely, leaders that focused on promoting cohesion over unity will be less prone to respond to internal dissent, increasing the likelihood of factional breakaways. In sum, inter-factional disputes and compromises are important sources of party unity and party fission, but internal rules or features of the political system such as the electoral law or party system competitiveness also shape intra-party competition.
A THEORY OF PARTY UNITY AND PARTY FISSION
Parties are voluntary associations composed of like-minded individuals joining together to solve collective action and coordination problems. Party members and party factions may extract greater payoffs both in the parliamentary arena (through log-rolling and coordinated voting behaviour) and in the electoral market, where enforced cohesion increases the value of party label and improves an MP's prospects for reelection.
14 However, the party is not a monolithic actor as members may hold heterogeneous preferences. Members with similar views gather and give birth to factions within a party. From this perspective, a party can be seen as a coalition of factions.
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Factions compete against each other to take control of the party and maximise their share of payoffs while cooperating to produce public goods and party unity, which the leader is responsible for preserving. 16 Intra-party politics swings between conflict and cooperation, with factions seeking a balance between the two. In the words of Laver and Kato, to the extent that 'political parties are endogenous, then members of party factions may be seen to belong for as long as it is rational to do so'. 17 Accordingly, inter-factional struggles and bargaining take place in the shadow of party fission.
I propose a game-theoretic model based on the 'Exit, Voice, and Loyalty' framework to shed light on party splits and the determinants of factional breakaways.
18 Figure 1 presents a game of party unity and party fission, describing factional disputes over payoff allocations under the threat of party break-up. For simplicity, I consider only two actors, the party leader, L, tied to the mainstream faction (composed of her followers) and a minority faction of dissenting members, F. The minority's size α is the share of congress votes won by the faction (a positive value below 0.5). The total amount of office payoffs to be shared sum to μ, which is equal to one, and any strategy undermining party unity imposes costs on the actors. L is in charge of allocating scarce resources such as cabinet spoils (office payoffs), the party line (policy payoffs), and candidacies (electoral payoffs) between the two factions.
16 Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991. 17 Laver and Kato 2001, 510. 18 The 'Exit, Voice, and Loyalty' game has been applied to individual members facing the choice between remaining in and leaving a party, see Hirschman 1970 . For specific applications to party fission: Gehlbach 2006;
Kato 1998.
FIGURE 1 Party Unity and Party Fission Game
Note: μ = value of party unity; α = minority's size; ν = damage due to public voice; ε = exit cost; π = minority payoffs after breakaway; ω = loss due to party fission. We assume that: μ = 1; 0 < α < 0.5; ε (0,0.5); π (0,0.5); ω (0,0.5); ν (0,0.5) and ν < α. F = minority faction; L = party leader. Payoffs are indicated in square brackets and kept separated by a semicolon. Faction payoffs are indicated first, followed by leader payoffs.
The leader needs to reward her supporters to avoid being dismissed. She will exploit her dominant position to retain all of the benefits and propose an unfair deal to the minority. The minority may then accept or use voice. If the faction complies, the gain will be zero (as dissenters are excluded from the allocation of rewards), and the leader's payoffs will be equal to μ (outcome U1). 19 If F uses voice, the entire party incurs costs ν due to the public exposure of internal dissent.
L can then propose a new deal. She can either reverse her choice, offering a compromise (where each faction will be rewarded on the basis of its strength), or use the whip to force the minority to accept her original position. A compromise will give the minority faction F α μ -ν, and retain
If L uses the whip option, the game reaches a final stage where the dissenters either comply or leave the party. If they toe the line (outcome U3), they in essence get the same payoffs as under the first stage outcome U1 (when F plays 'accept') reduced the cost ν for displaying intra-party disagreement to the public.
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Conversely, if the minority faction breaks away (outcome U4), F receives a payoff of π -ε, i.e., the benefit obtained when creating a new party minus the cost of leaving the current party. In case of a split, L receives all the benefits less the contribution of the minority faction leaving the party. The leader does not incur any cost for party disunity after a split, as the party becomes more cohesive, but suffers a cost ω for the loss in strength and image caused by the party break-up.
Her final payoff will be (1 -α) μ -ω.
A number of results can be shown using backward induction. Alesina and Cukierman 1990, 847. party disunity ν is high as well, the minority has a non-credible threat to split (i.e., F'spayoffs are higher inside the party as π -ε < 0 -ν) and will always accept the whip rather than leave the party. This is the second best outcome for L (who receives all of the payoffs minus the cost ν). F knows that it would be better off by choosing 'accept' at the first stage (due to ν) and agrees to the unfair deal U1.
This pattern resembles that of the 'dictator game', where the responder has little choice but to accept the proposal.
On the other hand, when ε is larger than π but ν is high (so that π -ε > 0 -ν), F retains a credible weak threat (in case it splits, the faction can only minimize its loss). 21 In this scenario, the outcome could be either U1 or U2 (Agreement). When the cost of party breakup ω is lower than the cost of party disunity ν for the leader L, party fission will be less damaging than bargaining for a compromise. As a consequence, F will accept the unfair deal (U1) to avoid the negative payoff of a breakaway. Conversely, when ω is greater than ν, L will focus on preserving unity at any cost to avoid the risk of party fission at the last stage. This induces a compromise and a final outcome U2.
Finally, when ε is relatively small and π is large, F chooses 'exit' at the last stage and threatens to leaving to enhance its bargaining power and obtain a larger share.
When ω is sufficiently large, L prefers to negotiate a compromise (U2). However, if ω is lower than ν, L will seek cohesion even at the expense of party unity and refuse a new deal, using the whip against dissenters and generating a Breakaway outcome U4. 21 Since the cost of breaking away still outweighs the benefit, this scenario is weaker than cases where factions gain strictly positive payoffs after fission. Table 1 summarizes the possible outcomes of the game based on the relationship between the four parameters π, representing the payoffs available to the minority faction after the breakaway; ε, which is the exit cost; ν, is the cost due to public voice; ω, which expresses the loss due to party fission. This game highlights the relative power of the party leader L and the minority faction F and how these affect intra-party distributive dynamics (i.e., portfolio allocation and party change). The likelihood of party fission is determined by two key elements, 1) the bargaining power of the minority, given by its ability to make a credible threat, and 2) the party leader's relative interest in unity or cohesion.
When the minority has a non-credible threat, the party leader has no incentive to pursue a compromise as party unity is not threatened. Potential splinter groups can exploit their bargaining power to demand a fair deal only when they have a credible threat. In turn, the leader will accommodate the minority's requests only if a breakaway will damage the party more than internal dissent. The minority is more likely to split when the payoffs are greater outside the party than inside (because of the unfair distribution) and exit costs are low (for instance, if there is no strong loyalty or the electoral system does not create barriers for new actors).
Conversely, the leader will pander to the minority when party unity is an issue at stake and fission would be a huge loss for the party, for example if a ruling party has a narrow margin over the opposition. A split is more likely when ideological disharmony and internal voice damage the image of the party. For example, dominant or ruling parties rarely tolerate dissent when they have a wide parliamentary margin. In such cases, party leaders will focus more on cohesion than unity.
These implications suggest a number of specific testable hypotheses related to the parameters in the game. I start by consider attributes that affect the balance between the cost of exit (ε) and the net benefit of a breakaway (π) for potential splinter groups to determine when a minority can gain from a breakaway and hence has a credible threat to split off from the party.
Any element increasing the share of policy, office, and electoral payoffs available to the splinter group after breaking away (π), will make a split more likely. Party members (and factions) incur a cost from party membership. 22 The cost is large when factions have ideal points far from the bulk of party members and hence fewer payoffs from policy. A breakaway may thus allow fringe factions to minimize membership cost and establish a party platform with larger policy payoffs (higher π). Assuming that party position corresponds to the weighted mean of all factions, 23 I propose the following hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 1: A breakaway by a faction i is more likely the greater the distance between i and the party position.
24
Factions are of course also interested in office payoffs and career rewards. They will consider their share of payoffs within the party and any potential gains after a breakaway. Hence, 'overpaid' factions with shares of office payoffs greater than their vote share should be less willing to split. 25 Conversely, 'underpaid' factions have larger expected payoffs (π) from defecting.
Hypothesis 2: Higher/lower office payoffs relative to faction size decreases/increases the likelihood of a split.
Factions also consider electoral rewards, e.g., the number of parliamentary seats they can win in future elections. More disproportional electoral rules preserve party systems and act as barriers to new parties. They increase the exit costs (ε)
for dissidents 26 and limits their ability to extract additional policy and office payoffs in the long-run, thus decreasing π. These effects should be greater under single-member plurality systems, but can also apply under proportional representation (PR).
Hypothesis 3: A more disproportional electoral system decreases the likelihood of a breakaway.
24 Using the median faction position as a proxy for party ideal point does not alter the results.
25 Minority factions could be overpaid when their threat is credible and the party leader is concerned about party unity (see below). Once overpaid, however, the greater reward itself influences the likelihood of a breakaway. 26 The splinter group will face high start-up costs for creating a new party and establish itself as a relevant actor. Party loyalty affects the balance between the costs (ε) and the benefits (π) of a breakaway. More specifically, partisan ties to symbols such as logos, labels, and the 'logic of appropriateness' 28 internalized through participation might dissuade members from leaving. 29 This is particularly relevant for older parties where party loyalty is well established and increases the exit cost (ε).
Hypothesis 5: The loyalty effect decreases the likelihood of party fissions in older
parties.
In addition to features that provide minority factions with incentives or disincentives to break away, the model also suggests that leaders can have different attitudes to party unity. 30 Leaders may seek to preserve unity at any cost (when ω > ν), or alternatively seek cohesion over a clear party line, with a willingness to eliminate internal challengers at any cost (ω < ν). The game illustrates how leaders will accommodate potential splinter group to decrease the likelihood of party fission. At the same time, if internal dissent is too damaging for the party, leaders will ignore the minority and make it more inclined to leave.
Leadership's attitude is related to internal democracy. Parties with intransigent rules, for instance parties organized according to 'democratic centralism' (e.g., Marxist parties) typically do not tolerate 'dissent'. 31 Any public expression of internal disagreement could weaken the party in the eyes of its voters. Under 'democratic centralism', party members are free to discuss party strategy and ideology, but can only disagree within the party. Once the party has established a position, dissenting members must submit. In this context, the public expression of dissent is costly (higher ν) and the benefits of party unity lower. Thus, the party leader would rather use the whip against the minority than seek a compromise.
Hypothesis 6: The likelihood of a breakup increases in parties ruled through
'democratic centralism'.
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The cost of internal division (ν) is higher for ruling parties, which face greater public scrutiny than the opposition. The competitiveness of the party system and the margin of the ruling coalition affect the value of unity (ω) and shape the balance between the costs of dissent and splits. When ruling parties have narrow majorities, any split could jeopardize government stability. Leaders will be more concerned with party unity given the higher cost of a breakup when the party may lose office (large ω). A leader will tolerate internal divisions provided they do not threaten unity. This gives party minorities bargaining leverage to extract substantial shares within the party. Conversely, if the degree of competitiveness is low (small ω) and the dominant coalition has a safe parliamentary margin there is less need for party unity. Splits no longer threaten government stability and party leaders may be less concerned over party fission. As such, leaders will refuse to accommodate minorities, use the whipping, and pursue the intra-party game to the breaking point (as in U4). In other words, leaders trade unity for cohesion to improving government effectiveness and establish party authority. The policy positions were extracted from the motions using Wordfish, an automated scaling model that analyzes the frequency of all of the words contained in a document. 
FIGURE 2 Diagnostic of Words Estimates. Word Frequency (Fixed Effect) and β
Values (Left-Right Scale) for the First (black) and the Second Period (grey) 44 The downfall of Communism changed the political meaning of some words and contributed to the beginning of the Italian transition, altering the Italian party system in the early 1990s. In both periods, the number of unique words analyzed is approximately 35,000. Factions positions are correlated (0.7) with the same estimates measured on the whole dataset. 45 The fixed effect is measured by the logged mean count of each word to capture how some words are used more often by all parties. Common words that appear with higher frequency across documents (e.g., prepositions) retain a higher fixed effect (frequency). However, they are not associated with political differences and their discriminating power (β) is close to zero.
Conversely, the discriminating power of rare words used only by a few parties will be higher. On average, we observe a split every two years. As such, party fissions and factional breakaways are not a rare event, but an ever-present threat posed to the party leadership and an opportunity for minority factions to negotiate a new distribution of payoffs. 50 The unit of analysis is the faction-per-cabinet. This allows to better assess the impact of office payoffs and parliamentary support, which might vary between party congresses.
Several independent variables were adopted. To test H1, I consider Distance the The data are encoded by cabinet. I report robust standard errors clustered by cabinet in each party congress since avoid possible problems from nonindependent observations or non-constant variances. 54 Table 3 presents the results.
In model 1, I only include variables that affect the credibility of the minority faction threat (faction side). In model 2, I separately estimate the effect of elements concerning the leader's attitude towards internal dissent (leader side).
Model 3 area represents the probability that a randomly selected positive outcome (Fission) is correctly rated with a higher predicted probability than a randomly selected negative observation. This statistics is higher in model 3 and indicates that both the credibility of the minority faction threat and the leader's attitude towards internal dissent help in predicting party splits. preferences are more likely to join together and more likely to split when intraparty heterogeneity increases. Even factions often considered merely officeseeking seem to pay attention to policy payoffs. Conversely, the strategic allocation of portfolios can counterbalance a lower amount of policy payoffs, thus contributing to preserve party unity. In turn, other elements such as party loyalty, disproportional electoral systems and open access to candidacies increase the exit costs for dissenting factions and decrease the credibility of threats to split. Splinter groups, however, do not make choices in isolation, and must weigh the leadership's attitude to party unity when threatening to defect. Under some conditions leaders may be willing to compromise to preserve party unity, under others they may use the whip against dissenters to enhance party cohesion.
Consistent with my theory, the level of intra-party democracy and the interelectoral level of party system competitiveness affect the leader's attitude, even if these factors only have a slight impact on the predictive ability of the model. The cost of 'voice' is higher in parties ruled through democratic centralism where leaders do not tolerate dissent, making minorities inclined to break away. For ruling parties, the cost of a 'breakup' increases with a smaller margin over the opposition, raising the leader's interest in a compromise to preserve party unity.
Conversely, leaders in ruling parties focus more on cohesion to enhance government effectiveness as the parliamentary support widens. 62 The lower cost of a breakup declines below the cost of voice, and splits become more likely.
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My findings demonstrate that parties can be considered as minimum winning coalitions of factions where all unnecessary subgroups are disregarded by the party leader and must face the choice between compliance and exit.
This article provides strong support for parties being a product of both intra-party competition and the party system. Both spheres of politics provide incentives for party unity as well threats to cohesion. When parties are internally polarized, party system fragmentation can be contained through consensual intra-party dynamics, disproportional electoral systems, and preference voting or decentralized candidate selection procedures that favour the institutionalization of party factions such as primary elections. These aspects are highly relevant for political elites that aim to simplify political supply through party mergers. When a party merger is merely a 'cold fusion' process based on instrumental and strategic concerns and without any policy basis, the internal wings will be more likely to break away to undermine elites efforts to decrease the fragmentation. My results highlight how any reform aiming to foster party system stability should include adjustments in the rules of the game to help keep factionalism under control and preserve party unity.
This article also demonstrates how quantitative text analysis techniques can be used to analyze intra-party politics and the policy preferences of factions. This could in turn be broadened to assess the effects of intra-party competition on other topics like portfolio allocation, government formation and stability, parliamentary behaviour, and the selection of a party platform. Moreover, the game-theoretic model also suggests additional implications for studies on party switching, party merger, and party unity in roll call votes.
Although this article evaluates the implications of the model on party fission empirically on a single country, the theoretical model is general and can be useful for understand intra-party dynamics in countries with factional politics such as Japan as well as other political systems characterized by heterogeneous intra-party preferences such as France, Germany, or the UK. Future research could pursue a comparative perspective on intra-party politics within different party systems.
